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L Facts
On September 23, 1989, Ronald Dale Yeatts ("Yeatts") murdered Ruby
Meeks Dodson ("Dodson"), a 70-year-old woman, during a robbery at
Dodson's house. Yeatts acted with Charles Michael Vernon ("Vernon"),
who had previously worked for Dodson and who searched her bedroom
while Yeatts committed the murder. Vernon later testified against Yeatts in
exchange for a twenty year sentence. In addition to circumstantial evidence
and the testimony of Vernon, Yeatts confessed to the killing. A jury found
Yeatts guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death based upon a
finding of future dangerousness.'
During the penalty phase of Yeatts's capital murder trial, the court
refused to allow jury instructions regarding Yeatts's ineligibility for parole
for thirty years. Yeatts's request to inform the jury of his parole status
rested on Eighth Amendment grounds that such evidence is mitigating,
supporting the contention that a life in prison sentence would be severe
enough and sufficient in his case.' The trial court denied Yeatts's request,
instructing the jury not to consider the question of parole, but merely to
focus on the question of life in prison or death. Yeatts acquiesced in the
court's interpretation and application of Virginia law.4
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Yeatts's conviction and
sentence.' The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.6 Yeatts filed
a state habeas petition in 1992 which the state habeas court dismissed.7 The
Supreme Court of Virginia then granted Yeatts's petition for appeal, but
denied relief.' Yeatts next applied for federal habeas relief in United States
District Court, raising a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim regard-
1. Yeafts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. IdL at 259.
3. Id. at 260.
4. Id. at 259.
5. Id. See Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 254 (Va. 1991).
6. Yeatts v. Virginia, 503 U.S. 946 (1992).
7. Yeatts, 166 F.3d at 259. Yeatts's habeas petition preceded Virginia's latest efforts
to streamline the habeas process in capital cases. Today, Yeatts's state habeas petition would
be presented directly to the Supreme Court of Virginia. See Brian S. Clarke, Case Note, CAP.
DEF. J., Fall 1997, at 30 (analyzing Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194 (Va. 1997)).
8. See Yeatts v. Murray, 455 S.E.2d 18 (Va. 1995).
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ing parole eligibility jury instructions, in addition to the other claims he
presented at state habeas.' The district court denied relief.'" Yeatts appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, claiming that
the state trial court erroneously barred him from informing the jury of his
parole eligibility during the sentencing phase and that his counsel was
"ineffective for failing to adequately death qualify the prospective jurors
during voir dire.""
IL Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
Yeatts failed to make a substantial showing that a denial of a constitutional
right occurred during his trial. Specifically, both Yeatts's claim regarding his
inability to inform the jury at trial of his parole eligibility and his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim regarding counsel's failure to conduct a sufficient
voir dire were procedurally barred.'2 Therefore, the court denied Yeatts a
certificate of probable cause to appeal and dismissed his petition. 3
III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. Presentation to the Jury of Parole Ineligibility
Yeatts's case presents two defense theories for entitlement to instruc-
tions to the jury on the defendant's ineligibility for parole. The first,
presented at trial, relied on the Eighth Amendment constitutional ground
that a defendant be allowed to present any mitigating evidence to the sen-
tencing body in a capital proceeding."' Yeatts argued that presentation of his
ineligibility of parole for thirty years was a relevant mitigating factor appro-
priate for presentation to the jury." This defense theory apparently was not
pursued beyond the direct appeal process.
The second theory for ineligibility of parole instructions, which Yeatts
claimed during his habeas process, relied on the Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional ground that Yeatts's due process rights were denied when the
court barred him from responding to the Commonwealth's future danger-
ousness evidence concerning Yeatts's prior criminal record. 6 Yeatts argued
9. Yeatts, 166 F.3d at 259-60.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 259-62.
12. Id. at 262, 265-66.
13. Id. at 266.
14. Id. at 260. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (forbidding procedural
barriers to consideration of mitigation). See also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986)
(forbidding exdusion of evidence that defendant adjusted well to incarceration).
15. Yeatts, 166 F.3d at 260.
16. Id.
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that his response to the Commonwealth's argument would have been to
inform the jury that he would be ineligible for parole for at least thirty years
if sentenced to life in prison instead of death.'7
Before the Fourth Circuit, the Commonwealth asserted that Yeatts's
Fourteenth Amendment claim was procedurally defaulted due to his failure
to raise the claim at the state court level on direct appeal. 8 The Common-
wealth noted that Yeatts raised an Eighth Amendment claim at trial and on
direct appeal, but did not make the Fourteenth Amendment claim until the
federal habeas level.1 9 Yeatts responded that the Commonwealth itself had
failed to argue this procedural default during habeas proceedings in the
federal district court.2" The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the merit of
Yeatts's argument that the government must plead procedural default in
order for it to apply such a defense thereafter.2' In other words, procedural
default is an affirmative defense which the government is responsible for
raising.
However, the Fourth Circuit, citing interests that transcend those of
the parties, such as comity and judicial efficiency, forgave the Common-
wealth's default.22 The court noted that the Commonwealth's default was
"unintentional."" The court was not so understanding of Yeatts. The
Fourth Circuit labeled Yeatts's default "obvious" for his failure to raise the
due process claim at the direct appeal or state habeas level, even though he
raised a related claim at those levels.2 Therefore, no matter how "uninten-
tional" Yeatts's failure to raise the appropriate constitutional claim may
have been, his actions were not excused, based on "transcend[ental]"
grounds.2"
After Simmons v. South Carolina,26 capital defendants in Virginia must





21. Id. at 261.
22. Id. The court also cited a desire to avoid the necessity of parsing state procedural
law. The court, however, is not at all averse to parsing state procedural law when doing so
wil permit denial of relief to a capital petitioner, as evidenced by its treatment of Yeatts's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, infra, and by a different Fourth Circuit panel's
treatment of Richard Charles Johnson in Johnson v. Moore, Nos. 97-33, 97-7801, 1998 WL
708691 (4th Cir. Sept.24, 1998). See Matthew K. Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J.
353(1999) (analyzing Johnson v. Moore, , Nos. 97-33, 97-7801, 1998 WL 708691 (4th Cir.
Sept.24, 1998).
23. Yeatts, 166 F.3d at 262.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 261.
26. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
1999]
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tenced to life in prison.2" The defendant has the right to inform the jury of
parole ineligibility even if the Commonwealth attempts to circumvent
Simmons by claiming reliance on the "vileness" aggravating factor.2" As a
practical matter however, counsel will also do well to present the severity
of life imprisonment with no hope of parole as mitigating evidence.29
B. Preservation of an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim after the Denial
of an Evidentiaty Hearing
At state habeas corpus proceedings, Yeatts cited as error the trial court's
denial of an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.3" The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the wording of Yeatts's
claim failed to preserve the underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim
and therefore the claim regarding an evidentiary hearing was moot and the
underlying claim of ineffective assistance of counsel defaulted." Yeatts next
argued at the federal habeas level, in front of a magistrate, that the proce-
dural rule relied on by the Supreme Court of Virginia should not foreclose
federal review because the state rule had not been regularly or consistently
applied in similar situations.32 Yeatts presented five cases illustrating this
discrepancy in application of the Virginia procedural rule." The federal
magistrate, in examining the application of this novel concept, found the
default rule inconsistently applied, thereby failing to provide Yeatts and
other similarly situated petitioners sufficient notice of the need for a more
specific assignment of error.3 The Fourth Circuit, this time not reluctant
to parse state procedural law, reversed the district court and denied Yeatts
relief on this technicality, though it did opine that the claim also lacked
merit.
35
27. In 1994, Virginia abolished parole for persons convicted of capital murder. VA.
CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1998).
28. Counsel are urged to contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse if the
Commonwealth utilizes this tactic.
29. See David D. Leshner, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 419 (1999) (analyzing Cherrix v.
Commonwealth, Nos. 981798, 982063, 1999 WL 101077 (Va. Feb. 26, 1999)).
30. Yeatts, 166 F.3d at 262-63.
31. Id. The court cited Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 5:17(c), which requires the
petitioner to list specific errors in the rulings below when raising claims at appeal and habeas
proceedings. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:17(c).
32. Id. at 263.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 264-65. Regarding the merits of Yeatts's claim, which related to the adequacy
of counsel's voir dire examination, counsel are urged to carefully read Morgan v. Illinois, 504
U.S. 719(1992) (holding juror unable to consider life sentence must be excused for cause), and
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 810 (1985) (holding juror may be excused for cause if juror's




There is little doubt that counsel who strive diligently to meet the
default standards exemplified in Yeatts will not completely be able to suc-
ceed. The Supreme Court of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit will simply
change the requirements again. Nevertheless, the effort must be made to
properly raise all claims for each subsequent level of direct and habeas
appeal.
Yeatts teaches that claims must not only be made on federal constitu-
tional grounds, but on allpossible federal constitutional grounds. Further,
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim treatment, ludicrous as it is,
reminds trial and direct appeal counsel to carve up every objection and
assignment of error into as many component parts as can be imagined.36
Matthew K. Mahoney
his instructions and oath), and strive for equal treatment and time during voir dire.
36. For another example of proper assignment of errors, counsel should consider
Sheppard v. Taylor, Nos. 980559, 980879, 1998 WL 743663 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998). See Alix
M. Karl, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 373 (1999) (analyzing Sheppard v. Taylor, Nos. 980559,
980879, 1998 WL 743663 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998)).
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